CO129-534-9 Law of Piracy- case of Rex v. Chung Tam Kwong 1-4-1931 - 20-4-1932 — Page 65

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to be considered as introductive of any new rule

but merely as declaratory of the old fundamental

constitutions of the kingdom; without which it

must cease to be a part of the civilised world.

Nevertheless, with all respect, I am of opinion

that international law does not occupy in the

English legal system the pre-eminent position which

is here claimed for it.

Further, this contention of the crown, is,

in my opinion, founded upon a mis-conception of

the constituent elements of international law which

in this matter gives no directions but merely

negatives a prohibition.

Outside the limits of a

Inter-

territorial jurisdiction the rule of international

law on which the crown here relies is permissive and

not obligatory. It is procedural and not positive.

Piracy jure gentium is not a crime in the sense in

which a breach of the common law is a crime.

national law in this branch is merely a succession

of precedents from which it may be deduced in what

circumstances the action of an individual state may

according to the international system be interfered

with and in what other circumstances each state is

free to act (see "The Lotus case", Ser. A., No.10,

7th September, 1927, International Court of the Hague).

No international undertaking, even by implication,

exists to punish pirates. If a nation provides no

legal machinery for the trial within its jurisdiction

of persons who commit piracy upon the high seas that

nation is not thereby amenable to international

correction.